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Introduction
A classical optimization problem of mathematical finance is to find the investment strategy that maximizes the expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ) of the portfolio value of some economic agent, see e.g. Chapter 2 of Föllmer and Schied (2002) . In mathematical terms, Eu(X) needs to be maximized in X where u is a concave increasing function and X runs over possible values of admissible portfolios. Note that the concavity of u refers to the risk aversion of the economic agent. Since 1947, this approach has been intensively used to model investor behaviour towards risk. However, as shown by Allais (1953) , one of the fundamental axioms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory is often violated empirically from the observed behaviour of agents.
Based on experimentation, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced the cumulative prospect theory, which provided a possible solution for the Allais paradox. First, this theory asserts that the problem's mental representation is important: agents analyze their gains or losses with respect to a given stochastic reference point B rather than to zero. Second, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assert that potential losses are taken into account more than potential gains. So agents behave differently on gains, i.e. on (X − B) + (where X, again, runs over possible values of admissible portfolios) and on losses, i.e. on −(X − B) − . Third, agents overweight events with small probabilities (like extreme events) and underweight the ones with large probabilities. This can be translated into mathematics by the following assumptions: investors use an "S-shaped" utility function u (i.e. u(x) = u + (x), x ≥ 0; u(x) = −u − (−x), x < 0 where u + , u − : R + → R are concave and increasing. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assume also that u − is "stronger" than u + : u − = 2, 25u + . Next, the investors distort the probability measure by a transformation function of the cumulative distributions: instead of expectations, Choquet integrals appear. Furthermore, maximization of their objective function takes place over the random variables of the form X − B.
That paper triggered an avalanche of subsequent investigations, especially in the economics literature, see e.g. the references of Jin and Zhou (2008) and Carlier and Dana (2011) . But from the mathematical side the first significant step ahead is due, quite recently, to Jin and Zhou (2008) . This late development, as pointed out in Jin and Zhou (2008) , is explained by the presence of massively difficult obstacles: the objective function is non-concave and the probability distortions make it impossible to use dynamic programming and the related machinery based on the Bellmann equation.
Up to now two types of models have been studied: complete continuous-time models or one-step models. Here, for the first time in the literature (to the best of our knowledge) we propose results in incomplete multiperiod discrete time models.
The existing studies in continuous time models heavily rely on completeness of the market (i.e. all "reasonable" random variables can be realized by continuous trading): see for example Jin and Zhou (2008) or Carlier and Dana (2011) . They also make assumptions on the portfolio losses. Carlier and Dana (2011) allow only portfolios whose attainable wealth is bounded from below by 0; in Jin and Zhou (2008) the portfolio may admit losses, but this loss must be bounded from below by a constant (which may depend, however, on the chosen strategy). Recall, however, that when the (concave) utility function u is defined on the whole real line, standard utility maximisation problems usually admit optimal solutions that are not bounded from below, see Schachermayer (2001) . Note also the papers of Prigent (2008) and Campi and Del Vigna (2012) which proposed explicit evaluations of the optimal solution for some specific utility functions.
It thus seems desirable to investigate models which are incomplete and which allow portfolio losses that can be unbounded from below. In this paper, we focus on discrete time models, which are generically incomplete. In Bernard and Ghossoub (2010) and He and Zhou (2011) , a single period model is studied. This is the first mathematical treatment of discrete-time multiperiod incomplete models in the literature. We allow for a possibly stochastic reference point B. More interestingly, we need no concavity or even monotonicity assumptions on u + , u − : only their behavior at infinity matters. Note that in Jin and Zhou (2008) and Carlier and Dana (2011) the functions u + , u − are assumed to be concave and the reference point is easily incorporated: as the market is complete any stochastic reference point can be replicated. This is no longer so in our incomplete setting.
The issue of well-posedness is a recurrent theme in related papers (see Bernard and Ghossoub (2010) , He and Zhou (2011) , Jin and Zhou (2008) and Campi and Del Vigna (2012) ). To the best of our knowledge, our Theorem 4.4 below is the first positive result on well-posedness for discretetime multiperiod models.
In Theorem 4.4 we manage to provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions which apply to a broad class of functions u + , u − and of probability distortions (see Assumption 4.1 and Remark 4.2) as soon as appropriate moment conditions hold for the price process. We also provide examples highlighting the kind of parameter restrictions which are necessary for well-posedness in a multiperiod context. It turns out that multiple trading periods exhibit phenomena which are absent in the one-step case.
Existence of optimal strategies is fairly subtle in this setting as no dynamic programming is possible and there is a lack of concavity and hence popular compactness substitutes (such as the Komlós theorem) do not apply. More surprisingly, and in contrast to the usual maximization of expected utility, it turns out that the investor may increase her satisfaction by exploiting randomized trading strategies. We provide two types of existence result. The first one (see Theorem 6.8 below) use "relaxed" strategies: we assume that the strategies are measurable with respect to some information flow, which have a certain structure and, in particular, allow the use of an external source of randomness (see Assumption 6.1). The second existence result (see Theorem 7.4 below) is proved for "pure" strategies if the information filtration is rich enough (see Assumption 7.1 which is satisfied by classical incomplete models): there is no need for an external random source.
The standard (concave) utility maximisation machinery provides powerful tools for risk management as well as for pricing in incomplete markets. We hope that our present results are not only of theoretical interest but also contribute to the development of a similarly applicable framework for investors with behavioural criteria.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce notation and the market model; section 3 presents examples pertinent to the well-posedness of the problem; section 4 provides a sufficient condition for well-posedness in a multiperiod market; section 5 discusses a relaxation of the set of trading strategies based on an external random source; section 6 proves the existence of optimal portfolios under appropriate conditions using "relaxed" controls which exploit an external random source; section 7 proves an existence result for the set of ordinary controls provided that the information filtration is rich enough; section 8 exhibits examples showing that our assumptions are satisfied in a broad class of market models; finally, section 9 contains most of the proofs as well as some auxiliary results.
Market model description
Let (Ω, F , (F t ) 0≤t≤T , P ) be a discrete-time filtered probability space with time horizon T ∈ N. We will often need the set of m-dimensional F t -measurable random variables, so we introduce the notation Ξ m t for this set. Let W denote the set of R-valued random variables Y such that E|Y | p < ∞ for all p > 0. This family is clearly closed under addition, multiplication and taking conditional expectation. The family of nonnegative elements in W is denoted by W + . With a slight abuse of notation, for a d-dimensional random variable Y , we write Y ∈ W when we indeed mean |Y | ∈ W. We will also need W + t := W + ∩ Ξ 1 t . When defining objects using an equality we will use the symbol := in the sequel. Let γ > 0, X be some random variable and A ∈ F an event. We will use the following notations:
Let {S t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be a d-dimensional adapted process representing the (discounted) price of d securities in the financial market in consideration. The notation ∆S t := S t − S t−1 will often be used. Trading strategies are given by d-dimensional processes {θ t , 1 ≤ t ≤ T } which are supposed to be predictable (i.e. θ t ∈ Ξ d t−1 ) The class of all such strategies is denoted by Φ. Trading is assumed to be self-financing, so the value of a portfolio strategy θ ∈ Φ at time
where X 0 is the initial capital of the agent in consideration and the concatenation xy of elements x, y ∈ R d means that we take their scalar product.
Consider the following technical condition (R). It says, roughly speaking, that there are no redundant assets, even conditionally, see also Remark 9.1 of Föllmer and Schied (2002) .
(R) The support of the (regular) conditional distribution of ∆S t with respect to F t−1 is not contained in any proper affine subspace of R d , almost surely, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.1. Dropping (R) and modifying Assumption 2.3 in an appropriate way proofs go through but they get very messy. In this case one should consider suitably defined projections of the strategies on the affine hull figuring in condition (R).
The following absence of arbitrage condition is standard, it is equivalent to the existence of a risk-neutral measure in discrete time markets with finite horizon, see e.g. Dalang et al. (1990) .
(NA) If X 0,θ T ≥ 0 a.s. for some θ ∈ Φ then X 0,θ T = 0 a.s. The next proposition is a trivial reformulation of Proposition 1.1 in Carassus and Rásonyi (2007) .
We now present the hypotheses on the market model that will be needed for our main results in the sequel.
The first item in the above assumption could be weakened to the existence of the N th moment for N large enough but this would lead to complicated book-keeping with no essential gain in generality, which we prefer to avoid. In the light of Proposition 2.2, (1) is a certain strong form of noarbitrage. Note that if either κ t or π t is not constant, then even a simple von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximisation problem may be ill posed (see Example 3.3 in Carassus and Rásonyi (2007) ).
Section 8 below exhibits concrete examples showing that Assumption 2.3 holds in a broad class of market models. We note that, by Proposition 2.2, Assumption 2.3 implies both (NA) and (R) above.
Now we turn to investors' behavior, as modeled by cumulative prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ; Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . Agents' attitude towards gains and losses will be expressed by the functions u + and u − . Agents are assumed to have a (possibly stochastic) reference point B and probability distortion functions w + and w − .
Formally, we assume that u ± : R + → R + and w ± : [0, 1] → [0, 1] are measurable functions such that u ± (0) = 0, w ± (0) = 0 and w ± (1) = 1. We fix B, a scalar-valued random variable in Ξ 1 T . Example 2.4. A typical choice is taking
for some k > 0 and setting
with constants 0 < α ± , γ ± ≤ 1. In Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , based on experimentation, the following choice was made: α ± = 0.88, k = 2.25, γ + = 0.61 and γ − = 0.69.
We define, for X 0 ∈ Ξ 1 0 and θ ∈ Φ,
We denote by A(X 0 ) the set of strategies θ ∈ Φ such that V − (X 0 ; θ 1 , . . . , θ T ) < ∞ and we call them admissible (with respect to X 0 ).
Remark 2.5. If there were no probability distortions (i.e. w ± (p) = p) then we would simply get
We refer to Carassus and Pham (2009) for the explicit treatment of this problem in a continuous time, complete case under the assumptions that u + is concave, u − is convex (hence u is piecewise concave) and B is deterministic. In Berkelaar et al. (2004) this problem is studied again in a complete, continuous time model but for a power convex-convave shaped utility function. In Carassus and Rásonyi (2012) this problem is investigated in a general discrete-time multiperiod model under the hypothesis that the (suitably defined) asymptotic elasticity of u − is strictly greater than that of u + .
The present paper is concerned with maximizing V (X 0 ; θ 1 , . . . , θ T ) over θ ∈ A(X 0 ). We seek to find conditions ensuring well-posedness, i.e.
and the existence of θ * ∈ A(X 0 ) attaining this supremum.
Remark 2.6. One may wonder whether the set A(X 0 ) is rich enough. Assume that u − (x) ≤ c(1 + x η ) for some c, η > 0, X 0 , B ∈ W and w − (p) ≤ Cp δ− for some 0 < δ − ≤ 1 and C > 0. Then Lemma 9.3 below implies that the strategy θ t = 0, t = 1, . . . , T is in A(X 0 ), in particular, the latter set is non-empty. If, furthermore, ∆S t ∈ W t for all t then θ ∈ A(X 0 ) whenever θ t ∈ W t−1 , t = 1, . . . , T . This remark applies, in particular, to u − and w − in Example 2.4 above.
A first look at well-posedness
In this section we find parameter restrictions that need to hold in order to have a well-posed problem in the setting of e.g. Example 2.4. The discussion below sheds light on the assumptions we will make later in section 4.
For simplicity we assume that u + (x) = x α+ and u − (x) = x α− for some 0 < α ± ≤ 1; the distortion functions are w + (t) = t γ+ , w − (t) = t γ− for some 0 < γ ± ≤ 1. The example given below applies also to w ± with a power-like behavior near 0 such as those in Example 2.4 above.
Let us consider a two-step market model with S 0 = 0, ∆S 1 uniform on [−1, 1], P (∆S 2 = ±1) = 1/2 and ∆S 2 is independent of ∆S 1 . Let F 0 , F 1 , F 2 be the natural filtration of S 0 , S 1 , S 2 . It is easy to check that Assumption 2.3 holds with κ 0 = κ 1 = 1/2, π 0 = 1/4 and π 1 = 1/2. Let us choose initial capital X 0 = 0 and reference point B = 0. We consider the strategy θ ∈ Φ given by θ 1 = 0 and θ 2 = g(∆S 1 ) with g : [−1, 1) → [1, ∞) defined by g(x) = ( 2 1−x ) 1/ℓ , where ℓ > 0 will be chosen later. Then the distribution function of θ 2 is given by
It follows that
If we have α + /γ + > α − /γ − then there is ℓ > 0 such that
which entails V − (0; θ 1 , θ 2 ) < ∞ (so indeed θ ∈ A(0)) and V + (0; θ 1 , θ 2 ) = ∞ so the optimization problem becomes ill-posed. One may wonder whether this phenomenon could be ruled out by restricting the set of strategies e.g. to bounded ones. The answer is no. Considering θ 1 (n) := 0, θ 2 (n) := min{θ 2 , n} for n ∈ N we obtain easily that θ(n) ∈ A(0) and V + (0; θ 1 (n), θ 2 (n)) → ∞, V − (0; θ 1 (n), θ 2 (n)) → V − (0; θ 1 , θ 2 ) < ∞ by monotone convergence, which shows that we still have
where ψ ranges over the family of bounded strategies of A(0) only. This shows that the ill-posedness phenomenon is not just a pathology but comes from the multi-periodic setting: one may use the information available at time 1 when choosing the investment strategy θ 2 .
We mention another case of ill-posedness which is present already in one-step models, as noticed in He and Zhou (2011) and Bernard and Ghossoub (2010) . We slightly change the previous setting. We choose u + (x) = x α+ and u − (x) = kx α− , for k > 0 and 0 < α ± ≤ 1. We allow general distortions, assuming only that w ± (p) > 0 for p > 0. The market is defined by S 0 = 0, ∆S 1 = ±1 with probabilities p, 1−p for some 0 < p < 1 and F 0 , F 1 the natural filtration of S 0 , S 1 . Now the set A(X 0 ) can be identified with R (i.e. with the set of F 0 -measurable random variables). Take X 0 = B = 0 and θ 1 (n) := n, n ∈ N, then V + (0; θ 1 (n)) = w + (p)n α+ and V − (0; θ 1 (n)) = kw − (1 − p)n α− . If α + > α − then, whatever w + , w − are, we have V (0; θ 1 (n)) → ∞, n → ∞. Hence, in order to get a well-posed problem one needs to have α + ≤ α − , as already observed in Bernard and Ghossoub (2010) and He and Zhou (2011) .
We add a comment on the case α + = α − assuming, in addition, that w + , w − are e.g. continuous : whatever w + , w − are, we may easily choose p such that the problem becomes ill-posed: indeed, it happens if w + (p) > kw − (1 − p). This shows, in particular, that even in such very simple market models the problem with the parameter specifications of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) can be ill-posed (e.g. take any p > 0, 788 and consider the setting of Example 2.4 with the parameters of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) quoted there). We interpret this fact as follows: the participants of the experiments conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) would perceive that such market opportunities may lead to their arbitrary (inifinite) satisfaction.
Since it would be difficult to dismiss the simple models of this section based on economic grounds we are led to the conclusion that, in order to get a mathematically meaningful optimization problem for a reasonably wide range of price processes, one needs to assume both
In the following section we propose an easily verifiable sufficient condition for the well-posedness of this problem in multiperiod discrete-time market models. The decisive condition we require is α + /γ + < α − , see (8) below. This is stronger than (3) but still reasonably general. If w − (p) = p (i.e. γ − = 1, no distortion on loss probabilities) then (8) below is essentially sharp, as the present section highlights.
Well-posedness in the multiperiod case
In this section, after introducing the conditions we need on u ± , w ± , we will prove our sufficient condition for the well-posedness of the behavioural investment problem (Theorem 4.4).
Basically, we require that u ± behave in a power-like way at infinity (this is automatically true for any function having bounded from above positive asymptotic elasticity and bounded from below negative asymptotic elasticity, see Remark 4.2) and w ± do likewise in the neighborhood of 0. We stress that no concavity, continuity or monotonicity assumptions are made on u ± , unlike in all related papers.
Assumption 4.1. We assume that u ± : R + → R + and w ± : [0, 1] → [0, 1] are measurable functions such that u ± (0) = 0, w ± (0) = 0 and w ± (1) = 1 and
with 0 < α ± , γ + ≤ 1, k ± , g ± > 0 fixed constants and
This allows us to fix λ such that λγ + > 1 and λα + < α − .
Remark 4.2. The condition α ± , γ + ≤ 1 is not necessary for our results to hold true, it is just stated for ease of exposition. We first comment on (4) and (5). Define the utility function plies (5) . So only the behavior of u ± near infinity matters. This comes from Lemma 6.3 (i) of Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) (their proof does not rely on concavity) which asserts the existence of some x 0 > 0 such that for all
and we conclude that (4) holds since for (5) is similar. Note that if w ± (p) = p we prove in Carassus and Rásonyi (2012) an existence result under the condition (8), which asserts in this case that AE − (u) > AE + (u). Condition (8) has already been mentioned in the previous section. It has a rather straightforward interpretation: the investor takes losses more seriously than gains. The distortion function w + , being majorized by a power function of order γ + , exaggerates the probabilities of rare events. In particular, the probability of large portfolio returns is exaggerated. In this way, for large portfolio values, the distortion counteracts the risk-aversion expressed by u + , which is majorized by a concave power function x α+ . These observations explain the appearance of the term α + /γ + in (8) as "risk aversion of the agent on large gains modulated by her distortion function". Note that the agent will have a maximal risk aversion in the modified sense if (i) α + is high, i.e. close to 1 and (ii) γ + is low i.e. close to 0 (for small value of γ + the agent distorts a lot the probability of rare events and, in particular, of large gains). Thus in (8) we stipulate that this modulated riskaversion parameter should still be outbalanced by the loss aversion of the investor (as represented by parameter α − coming from the majorant of u − ).
A similar interpretation for the term α − /γ − in (3) can be given. One may hope that (8) could eventually be weakened to (3). We leave the exploration of this for future research.
We also note that the functions in Example 2.4 satisfy Assumption 4.1 whenever (8) holds.
The assumption below requires that the reference point B should be comparable to the market performance in the sense that it can be sub-hedged by some portfolio strategy φ ∈ Φ.
Assumption 4.3. We fix a scalar random variable B such that, for some strategy φ ∈ Φ and for some b ∈ R, we have
The main result of the present section is the following. 
In particular, the result applies for X 0 a deterministic constant. Now we sketch the strategy adopted for proving the well-posedness result of Theorem 4.4. First, we introduce an expected utility objectiveṼ that dominates the behavioural objective V (see Lemma 4.5 and Definition 4.6). As the dynamic programming does not work for V , we do not introduce some one-period model associated toṼ as it is usually done in expected concave utility theory. Instead, we make use of a multi-periodic auxiliary optimization problemṼ t (between t and T : see Definition 4.7). Then in Lemma 4.9, we show by induction that starting from any strategy (θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ), it is always possible to build a strategy (θ t+1 , . . . ,θ T ) which performs better for the optimisation problemṼ t and which is bounded by a linear function of the initial capital X t . Finally, applying the fact thatṼ dominates V , we use the strategy (θ 1 , . . . ,θ T ) in order to prove that V (X 0 ; θ 1 , . . . , θ T ) is always bounded by D(1 + E|X 0 | α− ), where the constant D does not dependent of θ (see (12)), showing well-posedness of Theorem 4.4.
In the sequel, we will often use the following facts: for all x, y ∈ R, one has:
Lemma 4.5. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.3 hold. There exist constantsk ± > 0, such that for all X 0 ∈ Ξ 1 0 and θ ∈ Φ:
Proof. See Appendix 9.1.1.
We introduce the auxiliary optimization problem with objective functionṼ :
Definition 4.6. For all X 0 ∈ Ξ 1 0 and θ ∈ Φ, we define:
As no probability distortions are involved inṼ , we can perform a kind of dynamic programming on this auxiliary problem, formulated between time t and T , 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Lemma 4.8. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3,
The following inclusions also hold true:
. . , θ T ). Recall also that for any bounded from below random variable X, E(X|F t ) < ∞ implies that X < ∞. This gives the first assertion. For the same reason,Ã(X 0 ) ⊂Ã 0 (X 0 ) and, by Lemma 4.5,
The crux of our arguments is contained in the next result. It states that each strategy inÃ t (X t ) can be replaced by another one such that the latter performs better (see (11)) and it is close to φ in the sense that their distance is linear in the initial endowment X t (see (10)).
Lemma 4.9. Assume that Assumptions 2.3, 4.1, 4.3 hold true. Then for each 0 ≤ t ≤ T , there exist C t n ∈ W + n , n = t, . . . , T − 1, such that, for all X t ∈ Ξ 1 t and (θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ) ∈Ã t (X t ), there exists (θ t+1 , . . . ,θ T ) ∈Ã t (X t ) satisfying for n = t + 1, . . . , T :
Proof. See Appendix 9.1.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. If A(X 0 ) is empty, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, by Lemmas 4.9 and 4.8, there is C 0
As θ ∈ A(X 0 ), by Lemma 4.5, using Hölder's inequality with p = α − /(λα + ) and its conjugate number q and the rough estimation
for an appropriate constant D (independent of θ), noting that W is closed under addition and multiplication. As E|X 0 | α− < ∞ was assumed, we get that this expression is finite, showing Theorem 4.4.
Remark 4.10. Theorem 3.2 of Jin and Zhou (2008) states, in a continuous-time context, that in a typical Brownian market model our optimization problem is ill-posed whenever u + is unbounded and w − (p) = p (i.e. no distortion on losses). It is worth contrasting this with Theorem 4.4 above which states that even if w − (p) = p and
This shows that discrete-time models behave slightly differently from their continuous-time counterparts as far as well-posedness is concerned. In discrete-time models the terminal values of admissible portfolios form a relatively small family of random variables hence ill-posedness does not occur even in cases where it does in the continuous-time setting, where the set of attainable payoffs is much richer.
For the subsequent sections we need to extend and refine the arguments of Lemma 4.9 (see (30) versus (24) below). This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. Let Assumptions 2.3, 4.1, 4.3 be in force. Fix c ∈ R and ι, o satisfying λα + < ι < o < α − . Then there exists K t such that
Note that the constant K t do not depend either on X t or θ.
Proof. See Appendix 9.1.3.
On the class of admissible strategies
In this section we look at some unexpected phenomena that arise when investigating the existence of an optimal strategy for problem (2).
In the context of game theory it was suggested already in Borel (1921) to apply mixed strategies (i.e. ones using randomness) as opposed to pure strategies (i.e. ones without randomness). This relaxation of the set of strategies is indispensable for cornerstone results such as the minimax and equilibrium theorems to hold (see von Neumann (1928) and Nash (1951) ). These celebrated theorems led to a widespread application of game theory in economics.
It is important to note that at the beginning, when the basic notions of game theory were introduced, there was no associated randomness appearing in the problem formulation. The randomness hence did not come from the nature of the considered problem but it was introduced exogenously so that a satisfactory theory could be established.
In the context of optimal stochastic control for partially observed diffusions, auxiliary randomness has been used in order to prove the existence of an optimal control. Fleming and Pardoux (1982) and Beneš et al. (1991) have showed, in different setting, that the optimal control fails to exist unless a relaxed class of randomized controls (called wide-sense) is used 1 . As far as we know, in the optimal investment context there has been no such investigations yet. For this reason we explain what we mean by external randomness in the framework of the present article.
A portfolio strategy θ t at time t is random by nature, it is a function of the information up to t − 1, as encoded by F t−1 . One may ask, inspired by game theory and Fleming and Pardoux (1982) , whether it makes sense to add further randomization to the strategy that is not intrinsic to the problem but comes from an exogenous random source. In more concrete terms, is it worth taking ε independent of the whole history F T , and considering θ t that is a function of F t−1 and ε ? The practical implementation of such an idea would be easy: a computer may be used to generate the random number ε.
As far as we know, this idea never came up in utility theory because in the standard framework it has not been used for existence results and also it does not lead to a higher level of satisfaction for the agent. To see this, consider a utility function u : R → R. Assume for simplicity that T = 1, F 0 = {∅, Ω} and F 1 := σ(∆S 1 ). Fix X 0 ∈ R. We assume here that the family of admissible strategies is the set of F 0 -measurable random variables, i.e. A := R. We assume also that Eu(X 0 + θ∆S 1 ) is finite for all θ ∈ A and that an optimal investment θ * ∈ A exists, i.e. Eu(X 0 + θ * ∆S 1 ) = sup θ∈A Eu(X X0,θ T ) (see Rásonyi and Stettner (2005) for conditions on u and S ensuring that the problem is well-posed and admits some solution).
Let us now define F ′ 0 := σ(ε) with ε independent of F 1 and consider
Here it is necessary to constrain the family of θs by an integrability condition as it may easily happen that both E[u(X 0 + θ∆S 1 )] − and E[u(X 0 + θ∆S 1 )] + are infinite and the expected utility may not be defined. We claim that sup
Indeed, ≤ is trivial from A ⊂ A ′ . Taking θ ∈ A ′ , we see that, using the tower law and the independence of ∆S 1 and θ,
where P θ denotes the law of θ. This computation supports our claim that the exogenous random source ε does not improve the agent's satisfaction for an expected utility criterion. Consequently, such randomizations do not make sense and thus were never considered. Note, however, that the previous argument relies on the tower law which applies only because we face a criterion of expected utility.
In the setting of the present paper there are "nonlinear" expectations (Choquet integrals) and it is not obvious whether an exogeneous random source is useful. In the rest of this section we will see that, somewhat surprisingly, such randomization does improve the satisfaction of a behavioural investor and hence it is worth exploiting.
In the rest of this section we investigate a one-step example (T = 1) with S 0 = 0, P (∆S 1 = 1) = P (∆S 1 = −1) = 1/2. Set G 0 := {∅, Ω} and G 1 := σ(∆S 1 ). Let ǫ i , i ≥ 1 be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, independent of G 1 such that P (ǫ 1 = 1) = P (ǫ 1 = −1) = 1/2. Define the sigma-algebras H 0 := {∅, Ω} and H n := σ(ǫ 1 , . . . , ǫ n ) for n ≥ 1. Let A n denote the set of H n -measurable scalar random variables for n ≥ 0.
Fix n≥ 0 and add some external randomization in the filtration, i.e. F t = G t ∨ H n . So Φ = A n in this case. We take the initial capital X 0 = 0 and also B = 0. Assume that u + (
Using again the tower law and the independence of ∆S 1 and θ, it is easy to see that
Here A(0) = A n because H n is generated by finitely many atoms, so there is no need for integrability restrictions on strategies (see (14)). Consider a sequence of optimization problems:
Introduce the notation M n := sup θ∈An V (0; θ), n ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.1. The strategy θ ≡ 0 is not optimal for M n , for any n.
Proof. From (13) and (14), we get that for θ ∈ A 0 , θ > 0, V (0; θ) = 1 2 θ 1/4 − 1 2 θ. So for θ > 0 small enough V (0; θ) is strictly greater than 0 = V (0; 0), showing that 0 is not optimal for M 0 . Hence, since M n+1 ≥ M n for all n ≥ 0, it is not optimal for neither of the M n .
Proposition 5.2 shows that introducing more and more external random sources increases the attainable satisfaction level, i.e. "gambling" leads to higher agent satisfaction. Once we accept the hypothesis that agents act according to preferences involving the distortions w ± , we also have to accept that, using external randomness, they may (and do) increase their satisfaction level. It seems thus reasonable to use the whole sequence ǫ i , i.e. to optimize over σ(ǫ i , i ∈ N)-measurable θ (note that in this case one needs to restrict the domain of maximization to those θ for which V − (0; θ) is finite, but this is a minor point which is not crucial for our discussion).
As by Kuratowski's theorem the spaces {1, −1} N and [0, 1] are Borel-isomorphic (see Theorem 80 on p.159 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1979) ), one may take, instead of σ(ǫ i , i ∈ N), H = σ(ε) where ε is uniform on [0, 1] and independent of F 1 . One may try to push this further by considering a sigma-algebra generated by a sequence of independent uniform random variables but this does not lead to a larger class of trading strategies as [0, 1] N is Borel-isomorphic to [0, 1], see again p. 159 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1979) . Finally, one may think of extending the optimization problem to σ(ǫ i , i ∈ I)-measurable θ, for an uncountable collection I. This, again, does not lead to a larger domain of optimization since if θ is a given σ(ǫ i , i ∈ I)-measurable random variable then it is also σ(ǫ i , i ∈ I 0 )-measurable for some countable I 0 ⊂ I. 3 The arguments of the previous paragraph show, together with Proposition 5.2, that a natural maximal domain of optimization is H. By using a uniform ǫ (independent of F 1 ) for randomizing the strategies an investor can increase her satisfaction and further randomizations are pointless as they do not provide additional satisfaction.
Based on discussions of this section we reformulate the problem of existence by enlarging the filtration: let G t , t = 0, . . . , T be a filtration and let S t , t = 0, . . . , T be a G t -adapted process.
We are now seeking θ * ∈ A(X 0 ) such that
where V (·) and A(X 0 ) are as defined in section 2. We will see in the next section that in this relaxed class of randomized strategies there exists indeed an optimal strategy.
6 Existence of an optimizer using relaxed strategies
In this section we prove the existence of optimal strategies after introducing some hypotheses. First, we will need a certain structural assumption on the filtration. Assumption 6.1. Let G 0 = {∅, Ω}, G t = σ(Z 1 , . . . , Z t ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , where the Z i , i = 1, . . . , T are R N -valued independent random variables. S 0 is constant and ∆S t is a continuous function of (Z 1 , . . . , Z t ), for all t ≥ 1 (hence S t is G t -adapted).
Furthermore, F t = G t ∨ F 0 , t ≥ 0, where F 0 = σ(ε) with ε uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent of (Z 1 , . . . , Z T ).
We may think that G t contains the information available at time t (given by the observable stochastic factors Z i , i = 1, . . . , t) and F 0 provides the independent random source that we use to randomize our trading strategies as discussed in the previous section in much detail. The random variables Z i represent the "innovation": the information surplus of F i with respect to F i−1 , in an independent way.
For the construction of optimal strategies we use weak convergence techniques which exploit the additional randomness provided by ε (the situation is somewhat analogous to the construction of a weak solution for a stochastic differential equation). Assumption 6.1 holds in many cases, see section 8 for examples. It may nevertheless seem that Assumption 6.1 is quite restrictive. In particular, it would be desirable to weaken the independence assumption on the Z i . For this reason we propose another assumption which may be easier to check in certain model classes and which will be shown to imply Assumption 6.1. Assumption 6.2. Let G 0 = {∅, Ω}, G t = σ(Z 1 , . . . ,Z t ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , where theZ i , i = 1, . . . , T are R N -valued random variables with a continuous and everywhere positive joint density f on R T N such that for all i = 1, . . . , T N , the function
is integrable on R, where f i is the marginal density of f with respect to its first i coordinates, for i = 2, . . . , T N . S 0 is constant and ∆S t is a continuous function of (Z 1 , . . . ,Z t ), for all t ≥ 1.
with ε uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent of (Z 1 , . . . ,Z T ). Remark 6.3. Condition (15) is quite weak, it holds, for example, when there is C > 0 such that
for some positive, bounded and integrable (on R) functions g i , (for example g i (y) = 1/(1 + y 2 )).
Proposition 6.4. If Assumption 6.2 above holds true then so does Assumption 6.1.
Proof. See Appendix 9.3.1.
Furthermore, the following assumption on continuity and on the initial endowment is imposed.
Assumption 6.5. The random variable B is a continuous function of (Z 1 , . . . , Z T ), X 0 is deterministic and A(X 0 ) is not empty. u ± , w ± are continuous functions.
Remark 6.6. If B is a continuous function of (S 0 , . . . , S T ) then Assumption 6.1 clearly implies the first part of Assumption 6.5. For conditions implying A(X 0 ) = ∅ see Remark 2.6 above.
Remark 6.7. We may and will suppose that the Z i figuring in Assumption 6.1 are bounded. This can always be achieved by replacing each coordinate Z j i of Z i with arctan Z j i for j = 1, . . . , N , i = 1, . . . , T .
We now present our main result on the existence of an optimal strategy. Theorem 6.8. Let Assumptions 2.3, 4.1, 4.3, 6.1 and 6.5 hold. Then there is θ
We sketch the proof of Theorem 6.8. First, we fix some λα + < χ < α − for what follows. In Lemma 4.11 above and Lemma 6.10 below, we refine certain arguments of Lemma 4.9: instead of building a particular strategyθ from some strategy θ, we show that the boundness from below of V implies that sup θ,t E|θ t+1 − φ t+1 | τ is bounded, for any χ < τ < α − . This allows us to prove that a maximizing sequence for problem V is tight and thus weakly converges. The problem is then to construct some strategy with the same law as the above weak limit but also F -predictable. To this end we need first to consider a sequence including (Z 1 , . . . , Z T ). But this is not enough: consider the following example showing that a weak limit of some F -predictable sequence may fail to be F -predictable. Example 6.9. Consider the probability space Ω := [0, 1] equipped with its Borel sigma-field and the Lebesgue measure. Take ξ(ω) := ω for ω ∈ Ω and for n ≥ 1, η n (ω) := n(ω − (k/n)), for ω ∈ [k/n, (k + 1)/n), k = 0, . . . , n − 1. Clearly, each η n is a function of ξ, actually, every random variable on this probability space is a function of ξ. Nonetheless the weak limit of the sequence Law(ξ, η n ) is easily seen to be the uniform law on [0, 1] 2 . We claim that there is no η defined on Ω such that (ξ, η) has uniform law on [0, 1] 2 . Indeed, η is necessarily a function of ξ hence it cannot be also independent of it. This shows that, in order to construct η with the property that (ξ, η) has the required (uniform) law, one needs to extend the probability space.
Therefore we add some random noises (ε ′ , ε 1 , . . . , ε T ). The noise ε ′ is used to build some admissible set A ′ (X 0 ), where we choose some maximizing sequence (θ 1 (j), . . . , θ T (j)) j . Then we consider the sequence (Y j ) j , where Y j := (ε ′ , θ 1 (j), . . . , θ T (j), Z 1 , . . . , Z T ), which is also tight and call µ its weak limit. Then we construct inductively, θ * t , t = 1, . . . , T such that (ε ′ , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * T , Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) has law µ and θ * t depends only on (ε ′ , ε 1 , . . . , ε t , Z 1 , . . . , Z t−1 ) and hence it is F t−1measurable. Finally, we show that this strategy θ * is optimal. Lemma 6.10. Let Assumptions 2.3, 4.1, 4.3 be in force. Fix c ∈ R and τ with λα + < τ < α − . Then there exist constants G t , t = 0, . . . , T − 1 such that
Note that the constants G t , t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do not depend either on X 0 or on θ.
Proof. See Appendix 9.1.5.
Proof of Theorem 6.8. Lemma 9.4 with the choice E := ε, l = 2 gives usε, ε ′ independent, uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and F 0 -measurable. Introduce
. Note that if θ ∈ A(X 0 ) then there exists θ ′ ∈ A ′ (X 0 ) such that the law of (θ, ∆S) equals that of (θ ′ , ∆S) (since the law of ε equals that of ε ′ and both are independent of ∆S). It follows that for all θ
By Assumption 6.5 and Theorem 4.4, the supremum is finite and we can fix c such that −∞ < c < inf j V (X 0 ; θ 1 (j), . . . , θ T (j)). By Lemma 4.5 it implies that for all j, V (X 0 ; θ 1 (j), . . . , θ T (j)) > c.
By the discussions above we may and will assume θ(j) ∈ A ′ (X 0 ), j ∈ N. Apply Lemma 6.10 for some τ such that χ < τ < α − to get sup j,t
It follows that the sequence of T (d + N ) + 1-dimensional random variables
are bounded in L τ (recall Remark 6.7) and hence
for some fixed C > 0. So for any η > 0, P (|Ỹ j | ∈ R \ [− (2C/η) 1/τ , (2C/η) 1/τ ]) < η for all j hence the sequence of the laws ofỸ j is tight. Then, by Lemma 9.2, the sequence of laws of Y j := (ε ′ , θ 1 (j), . . . , θ T (j), Z 1 , . . . , Z T ), is also tight and hence admits a subsequence (which we continue to denote by j) weakly convergent to some probability law µ on B(R T (d+N )+1 ). We will construct, inductively, θ * t , t = 1, . . . , T such that (ε ′ , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * T , Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) has law µ and θ * is F -predictable. Let M be a T (d + N ) + 1-dimensional random variable with law µ. First note that (M 1+T d+1 , . . . , M 1+T d+N ) has the same law as Z 1 , . . . , (M 1+T d+(T −1)N +1 , . . . , M 1+T d+T N ) has the same law as Z T . Now let µ k be the law of (M 1 , . . . , M 1+kd , M 1+dT +1 , . . . , M 1+dT +N T ) on R kd+N T +1 (which represents the marginal of µ with respect to its first 1 + kd and last N T coordinates), k ≥ 0.
As a first step, we apply Lemma 9.4 with E :=ε, l := T to get σ(ε)-measurable random variables ε 1 , . . . , ε T that are independent with uniform law on [0, 1].
Applying Lemma 9.5 with the choice N 1 = d, N 2 = 1, Y = ε ′ and E = ε 1 we get a function G such that (ε ′ , G(ε ′ , ε 1 )) has the same law as the marginal of µ 1 with respect to its first 1 + d coordinates.
We recall the following simple fact. Let Q, Q ′ , U , U ′ random variables such that Q and Q ′ have same law and U and U ′ have same law. If Q is independent of U and Q ′ is independent of U ′ , then (Q, U ) and (Q ′ , U ′ ) have same law.
Let
. . , M 1+dT +dN ) and U ′ = (Z 1 , . . . , Z T ). As (ε 1 , ε ′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) are independent, we get that Q ′ is independent of U ′ . Now remark that weak convergence preserves independence: since (ε ′ , θ 1 (j)) and U ′ are independent for all j, we get that Q is independent of U . So we conclude that (ε ′ , G(ε ′ , ε 1 ), Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) has law µ 1 . Define θ * 1 := G(ε ′ , ε 1 ), this is clearly F 0 -measurable. Carrying on, let us assume that we have found θ * j , j = 1, . . . , k such that (ε ′ , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * k , Z 1 , . . . Z T ) has law µ k and θ * j is a function of ε ′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z j−1 , ε 1 , . . . , ε j only (and is thus F j−1 -measurable). We apply Lemma 9.5 with N 1 = d, N 2 = kd + kN + 1, E = ε k+1 and
to get G such that (Y, G(Y, ε k+1 )) has the same law as (M 1 , . . . , M 1+kd , M 1+T d+1 , . . . , M 1+T d+kN , M 1+kd+1 , . . . , M 1+(k+1)d ). Thus
has the same law as Q = (M 1 , . . . , M 1+(k+1)d , M 1+T d+1 , . . . , M 1+T d+kN ), the marginal of µ k+1 with respect to its first 1 + T d + kN coordinates. Now choose U = (M 1+dT +kN +1 , . . . , M 1+dT +dN ) (the marginal of µ k+1 with respect to its (T −k)N last remaining coordinates) and U ′ = (Z k+1 , . . . , Z T ).
As Q ′ depends only on (ε 1 , . . . , ε k+1 , ε ′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z k ), which is independent from (Z k+1 , . . . , Z T ), Q ′ is independent of U ′ . Moreover, (ε ′ , θ 1 (j), . . . , θ k+1 (j), Z 1 , . . . , Z k ) and (Z k+1 , . . . , Z T ) are independent for all j and weak convergence preserves independence, so Q is independent of U . This entails that (ε ′ , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * k , G(Y, ε k+1 ), Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) has law µ k+1 and setting θ * k+1 := G(Y, ε k+1 ) we make sure that θ * k+1 is a function of ε ′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z k , ε 1 , . . . , ε k+1 only, a fortiori, it is F k -measurable. We finally get all the θ * j , j = 1, . . . , T such that the law of (ε ′ , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * T , Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) equals µ = µ T . We will now show that
which will conclude the proof. Indeed, H j := X 0 + T t=1 θ t (j)∆S t − B clearly converges in law to H := X 0 + T t=1 θ * t ∆S t − B, j → ∞ (note that ∆S t and B are continuous functions of the Z t and X 0 is deterministic). By continuity of u + , u − also u ± ([H j ] ± ) tends to u ± ([H] ± ) in law which entails that P (u ± ([H j ] ± ) ≥ y) → P (u ± ([H] ± ) ≥ y) for all y outside a countable set (the points of discontinuities of the cumulative distribution functions of u ± ([H] ± )).
It suffices thus to find a measurable function h(y) with w + (P (u + [H j ] + ≥ y)) ≤ h(y), j ≥ 1 and ∞ 0 h(y)dy < ∞ and then (sup) Fatou's lemma will imply (16). We get, just like in Lemma 4.5, using Chebishev's inequality, (4) and (6), for y ≥ 1:
for some constant C > 0 and W t ∈ W + , t = 1, . . . , T , using Hölder's inequality with p := τ /(λα + ) and its conjugate q (recall that ∆S t ∈ W t ). We know from the construction that sup j,t E|θ t (j) − φ t | τ < ∞. Thus we can find some constant C ′ > 0 such that w + (P (u + [H j ] + ≥ y)) ≤ C ′ /y λγ+ , for all j. Now trivially w + (P (u + [H j ] + ≥ y)) ≤ w + (1) = 1 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Setting h(y) := 1 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 and h(y) := C ′ /y λγ+ for y > 1, we conclude since λγ + > 1 and thus 1/y λγ+ is integrable on [1, ∞).
Existence without using relaxed strategies
In the previous section, a class of "relaxed" strategies was considered in the sense that the investor was allowed to make use of an external random source (i.e. a random number generated by a computer), see Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2 above. One may wonder whether it is possible to prove the existence of an optimal strategy in the class of non-relaxed strategies. We will see that this is possible under suitable hypotheses.
Assumption 7.1 below states that the filtration is generated by the independent random shocks Z t , t ≥ 1 which move the prices at t and the filtration is rich enough in information in the sense that there are risks arising at time t in the market (represented by U t ) that are not hedgeable by the traded financial instruments. In other words, there is enough "noise" in the market (which is the case in most real markets).
Assumption 7.1 is satisfied in a broad class of processes that are natural discretizations of continuous-time diffusion models for asset prices. It holds, roughly speaking, when the market is "incomplete", see the examples of section 8 below for more details.
Assumption 7.1. Let F 0 = {∅, Ω}, F t = σ(Z 1 , . . . , Z t ) for t = 1, . . . , T , where the Z i , i = 1, . . . , T are R N -valued independent random variables. S 0 is constant and S 1 = f 1 (Z 1 ), S t = f t (S 1 , . . . , S t−1 , Z t ), t = 2, . . . , T for some continuous functions f t (hence S t is adapted).
Furthermore, for t = 1, . . . , T there exists an F t -measurable uniformly distributed random variable U t which is independent of F t−1 ∨ σ(S t ). Assumption 6.5 needs to be replaced by Assumption 7.2. The random variable B is a continuous function of (S 1 , . . . , S T ) and A(X 0 ) is not empty. u ± , w ± are continuous functions.
Remark 7.3. Note that under Assumption 7.1, the initial capital X 0 is necessarily deterministic.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.8.
Proof of Theorem 7.4. As in the proof of Theorem 6.8, take θ(j) ∈ A(X 0 ), j ∈ N such that
Using Theorem 4.4, Lemmata 4.5, 6.10 and 9.2 just like in the proof of Theorem 6.8 we find that a subsequence in A(X 0 ) (still denoted by j) of the 2T d-dimensional random variables Y j := (S 1 , . . . , S T , θ 1 (j), . . . , θ T (j)), converges weakly to some probability law µ on B(R 2T d ). We will also use the notation Y (k) j := (S 1 , . . . , S k , θ 1 (j), . . . , θ k (j)) and denote its law on B(R 2kd ) by µ k (j). Let M be a 2T d-dimensional random variable with law µ. Let µ k be the law of (M 1 , . . . , M kd , M T d+1 , . . . , M T d+kd ) on B(R 2kd ). Note that the law of Y (k) j , µ k (j), weakly converges to µ k . We shall construct, inductively, θ * i , i = 1, . . . , T such that F k := (S 1 , . . . , S k , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * k ) has law µ k for all k = 1, . . . , T , and θ * = (θ * 1 , . . . , θ * T ) is F -predictable. As θ 1 (j) are deterministic numbers, weak convergence implies that they converge to some (deterministic) θ * 1 which is then F 0 -measurable. Clearly, (S 1 , θ * 1 ) has law µ 1 . Carrying on, let us assume that we have found θ * i , i = 1, . . . , k such that F k has law µ k and θ * j is F j−1 -measurable for j = 1, . . . , k.
We now apply Lemma 9.5 with N 1 = d, N 2 = 2kd, E = U k and Y = F k to get G such that (F k , G(F k , U k )) has the same law as (M 1 , . . . , M kd , M T d+1 , M T d+(k+1)d ), we denote this law bȳ µ k henceforth (note that, by Assumption 7.1, U k is independent of F k ). Define θ * k+1 := G(F k , U k ), this is clearly F k -measurable. It remains to show that F k+1 has law µ k+1 . As µ k+1 is the weak limit of Y (k+1) j , it is enough to prove that the weak limit of Y (k+1) j is F k+1 . We first express the laws of Y (k+1) j and F k+1 by mean of conditioning. By Assumption 7.1 one can write S k+1 = f k+1 (S 1 , . . . , S k , Z k+1 ) with some continuous function f k+1 . Notice that the law of the 2(k + 1)d-dimensional random variable F k+1 is µ k+1 (dx) =μ k (dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 )ρ(dσ k+1 |σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 ) where we write dx = (dx 1 , . . . , dx 2(k+1)d ) = (dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k+1 , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 ), dσ j = (dx (j−1)d+1 , . . . , dx jd ) for j = 1, . . . , k + 1 and dτ i = (dx (k+i)d+1 , . . . , dx (k+i+1)d ) for i = 1, . . . , k + 1. The probabilistic kernel ρ is defined by ρ(A|σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 ) := P (S k+1 ∈ A|S 1 = σ 1 , . . . , S k = σ k , θ *
The crucial observation here is that ρ does not depend on (τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 ).
It follows in the same way that, for all j, the law of Y (k+1) j is µ k+1 (j)(dx) =μ k (j)(dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 )ρ(dσ k+1 |σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 ), whereμ k (j) is the law of (S 1 , . . . , S k , θ 1 (j), . . . , θ k+1 (j)). Clearly, the weak convergence of the Law(Y j ) to µ implies that their marginalsμ k (j) converge weakly toμ k , for each k. To conclude the proof, we have to show that this implies also µ k+1 (j)(dx) =μ k (j)(dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 )ρ(dσ k+1 |σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 ) → µ k+1 (dx) =μ k (dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 )ρ(dσ k+1 |σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 )
weakly as j → ∞. First notice that, for any sequence z n → z in R (2k+1)d , ρ(·|z n ) tends to ρ(·|z) weakly. Indeed, taking any continuous and bounded h on R d , we have
by continuity of h, f k+1 , boundedness of h and Lebesgue's theorem. Now take any uniformly continuous and bounded g :
We claim thatḡ is continuous. Indeed, let z n → z. Then
Here the first term tends to zero by uniform continuity, the second term tends to zero by the weak convergence of ρ(·|z n ) to ρ(·|z). This shows the continuity ofḡ. Asμ k (j) converge weakly toμ k , it follows that
This implies that R (2k+2)d g(σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 , σ k+1 )ρ(dσ k+1 |σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 )μ k (j)(dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 ) → R (2k+2)d g(σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 , σ k+1 )ρ(dσ k+1 |σ 1 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , . . . , τ k+1 )μ k (dσ 1 , . . . , dσ k , dτ 1 , . . . , dτ k+1 ), (18) showing that (17) holds (recall that, in order to check weak convergence, it is enough to verify (18) for uniformly continuous bounded functions, see Theorem 1.1.1 of Stroock and Varadhan (1979) ) and the induction step is completed. We finally arrive at (S 1 , . . . , S T , θ * 1 , . . . , θ * T ) with law µ T = µ. We can show verbatim as in the proof of Theorem 6.8 that
using the properties of weak convergence and that B is a continuous function of the S t , t = 1, . . . , T . This concludes the proof.
Examples
In this section, we first present some classical market models where Assumptions 2.3 and 6.1 hold true and hence Theorem 6.8 applies.
Example 8.1. Let S 0 be constant and ∆S t ∈ W independent t = 1, . . . , T . Take Z i := ∆S i , define G 0 := {∅, Ω} and G t := σ(Z 1 , . . . , Z t ), T ≥ 1. Assume that S t satisfies (NA) + (R) w.r.t. G t . Then this continues to hold for the enlargement F t defined in Assumption 6.1. So Assumptions 2.3 and 6.1 hold with κ t , π t almost surely constants since the conditional law of ∆S t w.r.t. F t−1 is a.s. equal to its actual law.
where µ : R L → R L and ν : R L → R L×N are bounded and continuous. We assume that there is
for all x ∈ R L ; Z t ∈ W, t = 1, . . . , T are independent with supp Law Z t = R N . Thus Y t follows a discretized dynamics of a non-degenerate diffusion process. We may think that Y t represent the evolution of L economic factors or, more specifically, of some assets. Take G 0 trivial and G t := σ(Z j , j ≤ t), t ≥ 1.
We claim that Y t satisfies Assumption 2.3 with respect to G t . Indeed, Y t ∈ W is trivial and we will show that (1) holds with κ t , π t constants.
Take v ∈ R L . Obviously,
It is thus enough to show for each t = 1, . . . , T that there is c > 0 such that for each unit vector v and each
Denoting by m an upper bound for |µ(x)|, x ∈ R L , we may write 1) ).
Here y = v T ν(x) is a vector of length at least √ h, hence the absolute value of one of its components is at least h/N . Thus we have
where i ranges over 1, . . . , N and k i ranges over the (finite) set of all functions from {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N } to {1, −1} (representing all the possible configurations for the signs of y j , j = i). This minimum is positive by our assumption on the support of Z t . Now we can take S i t := Y i t , i = 1, . . . , d for some d ≤ L. When L > d, we may think that the Y j , d < j ≤ L are not prices of some traded assets but other relevant economic variables that influence the market. It is easy to check that Assumption 2.3 holds for S t , too, with respect to G t .
Enlarging each G t by ε, independent of Z 1 , . . . , Z T , we get F t as in Assumption 6.1. Clearly, Assumption 2.3 continues to hold for S t with respect to F t and Assumption 6.1 is then also true as S t is a continuous function of Z 1 , . . . , Z t . Example 8.3. Take Y t as in the above example. For simplicity, we assume d = L = N = 1 and ν(x) > 0 for all x. Furthermore, let Z t , t = 1, . . . , T be such that for all ζ > 0,
Set S t := exp(Y t ) this time. We claim that Assumption 2.3 holds true for S t with respect to the filtration G t . Obviously, ∆S t ∈ W, t ≥ 1.
We choose κ t := S t /2. Clearly, 1/κ t ∈ W. It suffices to prove that 1/P (S t+1 − S t ≤ −S t /2|G t ) and 1/P (S t+1 − S t ≥ S t /2|G t ) belong to W. We will show only the second containment, the first one being similar. This amounts to checking
Let us notice that
which is a deterministic positive constant, by the assumption on the support of Z t+1 . Defining the enlarged F t , Assumptions 2.3 and 6.1 hold for S t . Examples 8.2 and 8.3 are pertinent, in particular, when the Z t are Gaussian.
We now show an example where Assumption 7.1 holds and hence Theorem 7.4 applies.
Example 8.4. Let us consider the same setting as in Example 8.2 with d = L < N . This corresponds to the case when an incomplete diffusion market model has been discretized (the number of driving processes, N , exceeds the number of assets, d). Let us furthermore assume that for all t, the law of Z t has a density w.r.t. the N -dimensional Lebesgue measure (when we say "density" from now on we will always mean density w.r.t. a Lebesgue measure of appropriate dimension). Recall that F 0 = {∅, Ω} and F t = σ(Z 1 , . . . , Z t ) for t = 1, . . . , T , It is clear that S t+1 = f t+1 (S 1 , . . . , S t , Z t+1 ) for some continuous function f t+1 . It remains to construct U t+1 as required in Assumption 7.1.
We will denote by ν i (x) the ith row of ν(x), i = 1, . . . , d. First let us notice that (20) implies that ν(x) has full rank for all x and hence the ν i (x), i = 1, . . . , d are linearly independent for all x.
It follows that the set {(ω, w) ∈ Ω × R N : ν i (Y t )w = 0, i = 1, . . . , d, |w| = 1} has full projection on Ω and it is easily seen to be in F t ⊗ B(R N ). It follows by measurable selection (see e.g. Proposition III.44 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1979) ) that there is a F t -measurable Ndimensional random variable ξ d+1 such that ξ d+1 has unit length and it is a.s. orthogonal to ν i (Y t ), i = 1, . . . , d. Continuing in a similar way we get ξ d+1 , . . . , ξ N such that they have unit length, they are a.s. orthogonal to each other as well as to the ν i (Y t ). Let Σ denote the R N ×Nvalued F t -measurable random variable whose rows are ν 1 , . . . , ν d , ξ d+1 , . . . , ξ N . Note that Σ is a.s. nonsingular (by construction and by (20)).
As Z t+1 is independent of F t and Σ is F t -measurable, for any (z 1 , . . . , z t ) ∈ R tN , the conditional law of ΣZ t+1 knowing {Z 1 = z 1 , . . . , Z t = z t } equals the law of the random variable Σ(z 1 , . . . , z t )Z t+1 . Recall that Z t+1 has a density w.r.t. the N -dimensional Lebesgue measure and that Z → Σ(z 1 , . . . , z t )Z is a continuously differentiable diffeomorphism since Σ(z 1 , . . . , z t ) is nonsingular. So we can use the change of variable theorem and we deduce that Σ(z 1 , . . . , z t )Z t+1 , and thus a.s. the conditional law of ΣZ t+1 knowing F t , has a density.
As (ν(Y t )Z t+1 , ξ d+1 Z t+1 ) is the first d + 1 coordinates of ΣZ t+1 , using Fubini theorem, the conditional law of (ν(Y t )Z t+1 , ξ d+1 Z t+1 ) knowing F t also has a density. Using again the change of variable theorem, it follows that the random variable (Y t+1 , ξ d+1 Z t+1 ) has a F t -conditional density. This implies that ξ d+1 Z t+1 has a F t ∨ σ(Y t+1 )-conditional density and, a fortiori, its conditional law is atomless.
Lemma 9.7 with the choice X := ξ d+1 Z t+1 and W :
is F t+1 -measurable and G is measurable from Lemma 9.7). It follows that this example satisfies Assumption 7.1 and hence Theorem 7.4 applies to it.
Remark 8.5. Clearly, Assumption 7.1 permits a non-Markovian price process S t as well (i.e. S t may well depend on its whole past S t−1 , . . . , S 1 ). Also, S t may be a non-linear function of S 1 , . . . , S t−1 , Z t in a more complex way than in Example 8.4. It is, however, outside the scope of the present paper to go into more details here. 9 Appendix 9.1 Proofs of Lemmas 4.5, 4.9, 4.11, 6 .10 and of Proposition 5.2 9.1.1 Proof of Lemma 4.5
We get, using (6) and Chebishev's inequality:
Evaluating the integral and using (4) we continue the estimation as
using the rough estimate x γ+ ≤ x + 1, x ≥ 0, Assumption 4.3 and the fact that
This gives the first statement. For the second inequality note that, by (5), (7) and Assumption 4.3,
9.1.2 Proof of Lemma 4.9
Notice that for t = T the statement of Lemma 4.9 is trivial as there are no strategies involved. Let us assume that Lemma 4.9 is true for t + 1, we will deduce that it holds true for t, too. Let X t ∈ Ξ 1 t and (θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ) ∈Ã t (X t ). Let X t+1 := X t + (θ t+1 − φ t+1 )∆S t+1 , then X t+1 ∈ Ξ 1 t+1 and by Lemma 4.8, (θ t+2 , . . . , θ T ) ∈Ã t+1 (X t+1 ). By induction hypothesis, there exists C t+1 n , n = t + 1, . . . , T and (θ t+2 , . . . ,θ T ) ∈Ã t+1 (X t+1 ) satisfying
Fix some λα + < χ < α − , we continue the estimation ofṼ + t :=Ṽ + t (X t ; θ t+1 ,θ t+2 , . . . ,θ T ) using the (conditional) Hölder inequality for q = χ/(λα + ) and 1/p + 1/q = 1.
It follows that, for an appropriate
By Lemma 9.1 below, the event
we have (recall that X t+1 = X t + (θ t+1 − φ t+1 )∆S t+1 ),
As a little digression we estimatẽ
So on F , by (24), (26) and (27), using |X t | λα+ ≤ |X t | α− + 1, we obtain that
Let us now choose the F t -measurable random variable C t t so large that on the event
One can easily check that such a C t t exists because in order to have the four preceding inequalities satisfied, it is sufficient that:
is greater than the right-hand side of the above inequality. So onF we have,
Consequently, definingθ t+1 := φ t+1 1F + θ t+1 1F c , θ n := φ n 1F +θ n 1F c , n = t + 2, . . . , T, we have, using (23) and (28), V t (X t ; θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ) ≤Ṽ t (X t ;θ t+1 , . . . ,θ T ) a.s..
By construction,
, and, for n ≥ t + 2,
where C t n−1 := C t+1 n−1 (C t t |∆S t+1 | + 1) for n ≥ t + 2. Clearly, C t n−1 ∈ W + n−1 . To conclude the proof it remains to check that (θ t+1 , . . . ,θ T ) ∈Ã t (X t ). As by hypothesis (θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ) ∈Ã t (X t ), we get from (23) thatṼ − t (X t ; θ t+1 ,θ t+2 , . . . ,θ T ) < ∞. Finally,
In the course of this proof we relied on Lemma 9.1 below.
Lemma 9.1. Assume that Assumption 2.3 holds true. Then there existsπ t > 0 with 1/π t ∈ W + t such that
Proof. Define the events
We prove, by induction, that for m ≥ t + 1,
for someπ t (m) with 1/π t (m) ∈ W + t . For m = t + 1 this is just (1). Let us assume that (29) has been shown for m − 1, we will establish it for m.
by the (conditional) Cauchy inequality. Here 1/π t (m − 1) ∈ W + t by the induction hypothesis, E(1/π m−1 |F t ) ∈ W + t (since 1/π m−1 ∈ W + ) and the statement follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.11
Fix c ∈ R and χ, ι, o satisfying λα
Let X t+1 := X t + (θ t+1 − φ t+1 )∆S t+1 . By Lemma 4.9, there exists C t+1 n ∈ W + n , t + 1 ≤ n ≤ T − 1, and (θ t+2 , . . . ,θ T ) ∈Ã t+1 (X t+1 ) such that
for n = t + 2, . . . , T andṼ t+1 (X t+1 ; θ t+2 , . . . , θ T ) ≤Ṽ t+1 (X t+1 ;θ t+2 , . . . ,θ T ).
We can obtain equations (23) and (24) just like in the proof of Lemma 4.9. Furthermore, using (26), we get (recall (25) for the definition of F ) :
We now push further estimations in this last equation. We may estimate, using the Hölder inequality for p = α − /o and its conjugate q,
The denominator here will be denoted C in the sequel. By Lemma 9.1, C < ∞. Now let us note the trivial fact that for random variables X,
holds true then, applying the trivial x ≤ x p + 1, x ≥ 0,
with suitable c 1 , c 2 > 0. Using again Hölder's inequality with p = o/ι and its conjugate q,
With suitable c ′ 1 , c ′ 2 > 0, we get, whenever (31) holds, that
Estimate also, with p := χ/(λα + ),
with somec > 0, using that x χ ≤ x o + 1, x 1/p ≤ x + 1, for x ≥ 0. Furthermore, Hölder's inequality with p = ι/χ gives
It follows that whenever
one also hasc
Finally consider the condition
It is easy to see that we can find some K t , large enough, such that
implies that (31) (recall (32)), (35), (37) all hold true. So in this case we have, from (30), (34), (36), (33) and (37), Assumptions 2.3, 4.1, 4.3 are clearly met (with φ ≡ 0). Theorem 4.4 implies that M n < ∞ for all n. Let c = V (0; 0), from Lemma 4.5 we get thatṼ (0; 0) = EṼ 0 (0; 0) ≥ c. Now fix some constant ι > 0 such that λα − < ι < α + . Looking at the end of the proof of Lemma 4.11 and remarking thatÃ 0 (0) = A n , we get that there exists constant K ≥ 0 such that if θ ∈ A n with E|θ| ι > K then EṼ 0 (0; θ) < c. From Lemma 4.5 again,
and hence θ is suboptimal.
It follows from the above argument that the optimization can be constrained to the smaller domains D n := {θ ∈ A n : E|θ| ι ≤ K} for each n. As the probability space is finite, the space of H n -measurable random variables (equipped with the topology of convergence in probability) can be identified with a finite-dimensional Euclidean space where D n is a compact set. Since the objective function V (0; ·) is easily seen to be continuous the supremum M n is attained by some strategy θ * n , n ≥ 0. Let Λ be the (finite) range of the random variable |θ * n |. By Lemma 5.1, Λ contains a nonzero element. Let a denote the smallest such element and b the largest one, we get that either Λ = {0, a 0 , . . . , a n } or Λ = {a 0 , . . . , a n }, with a = a 0 < a 1 < . . . < a n = b. Let us introduce the notations A + := {θ * n = a}, A − := {θ * n = −a}, A := A + ∪ A − = {|θ * n | = a}. For each δ ≥ 0 we will define a H n+1 -measurable strategy Θ n+1 (δ) which has a strictly better performance than θ * n for a suitable choice of δ, i.e.
In particular, θ * n = Θ n+1 (0). This definition implies that |Θ n+1 (δ)| = a + δǫ n+1 on A and |Θ n+1 (δ)| = |θ * n | outside A. So from (14) and using independence of ǫ n+1 and θ * n , one gets
Now we are looking at V + (0; Θ n+1 (δ)). First let us consider the case where a = b, then A = {|θ * n | = a} and A c = {|θ * n | = 0}. Take 0 ≤ δ < a. Note that in this case |Θ n+1 (δ)| may take only the values 0, a − δ, a + δ. So it follows that from (13) and using independence of ǫ n+1 and θ * n ,
We have that P (A) = P (|θ * n | = a) > 0 by the choice of a and P (A) does not depend on δ. So one can directly check that V + (0; Θ n+1 (δ)) is continuously differentiable in δ (in a neighborhood of 0) and
Hence, for δ > 0 small enough,
Now let us turn to the case where a < b. Then A = {|θ * n | = a} and A c = {|θ * n | ∈ {0, a 1 , . . . , a n }}. We may write (for δ small enough such that a − δ > 0 and a + δ < a 1 ),
Note that P (A), P (|θ * n | ≥ a 1 ), P (|θ * n | ≥ a 2 ),. . . , P (|θ * n | ≥ a n ) = P (|θ * n | = b) do not depend on δ and that P (A) > 0 by the choice of a. Again, one can directly check that V + (0; Θ n+1 (δ)) is continuously differentiable in δ (in a neighborhood of 0) and ∂ ∂δ V + (0; Θ n+1 (δ))| δ=0 = √ 2 8 a −3/4 − P (A) + P (|θ * n | ≥ a 1 ) + √ 2 P (A) + 2P (|θ * n | ≥ a 1 ) − P (|θ * n | ≥ a 1 ) .
By direct computation, as P (A) > 0, one get that ∂ ∂δ V + (0; Θ n+1 (δ))| δ=0 > 0 and for δ small enough, (39) holds true. Fix such a δ, recall from (38) that V − (0; Θ n+1 (δ)) = V − (0; θ * n+1 ) so M n = V (0; θ * n ) < V (0; Θ n+1 (δ)) ≤ M n+1 and Proposition 5.2 is proved. 9.1.5 Proof of Lemma 6.10
Take τ := α T < α T −1 < . . . < α 1 < α 0 := α − . We first prove, by induction on t, that X t := X 0 + t j=1 (θ j − φ j )∆S j , t ≥ 0 satisfy
for suitable C t > 0. For t = 0 this is trivial. Assuming it for t we will show it for t + 1. We first remark that EṼ t (X t ; θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ) = EṼ 0 (X 0 ; θ 1 , . . . , θ T ) ≥ c and that by the induction hypothesis E|X t | αt < ∞ holds. As θ ∈Ã(X 0 ) ⊂Ã 0 (X 0 ), (θ t+1 , . . . , θ T ) ∈ A t (X t ) (see Lemma 4.8). Thus Lemma 4.11 applies with the choice ι := (α t+1 + α t )/2 and o := α t , and we can estimate, using Hölder's inequality with p := ι/α t+1 (and its conjugate number q), plugging in the induction hypothesis:
≤ E|X t | αt + 1 + C (K t (E|X t | αt + 1) + 1) ≤ (1 + CK t )C t (E|X 0 | α− + 1) + 1 + C + CK t with C := E 1/q |∆S t+1 | qαt+1 , this proves the induction hypothesis for t + 1. Now let us observe that, by Lemma 4.11 (with ι = α t+1 , o = α t ),
concluding the proof.
Auxiliary results
We start with simple observations.
Lemma 9.2. Let (X n ) n be a tight sequence of random variables in R N . Then, for any random variable X in R N (i) (X n + X) n is a tight sequence of random variables in R N .
(ii) (X n , X) n is a tight sequence of random variables in R 2N .
Proof. Fix some η > 0, there exists some k 0 > 0 such that P (|X n | > k 0 ) < η/2, for each n. As ∩ m {|X| > m} = ∅, there exists k 1 such that P (|X| > k 1 ) < η/2. Thus, we obtain that P (|X n + X| ≤ k 0 + k 1 ) ≥ P (|X n | ≤ k 0 ) + P (|X| ≤ k 1 ) − 1 > 1 − η,
showing (i). It is clear that (X n , 0) n is a tight sequence of random variables in R 2N , so from (i), we deduce (ii). The following Lemmata should be fairly standard. We nonetheless included their proofs since we could not find an appropriate reference.
Lemma 9.4. Let E be uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then for each l ≥ 1 there are measurable f 1 , . . . , f l : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that f 1 (E), . . . , f l (E) are independent and uniform on [0, 1].
Proof. We first recall that if Y 1 , Y 2 are uncountable Polish spaces then they are Borel isomorphic, i.e. there is a bijection ψ : Y 1 → Y 2 such that ψ, ψ −1 are measurable (with respect to the respective Borel fields); see e.g. page 159 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1979) .
Fix a Borel-isomorphism ψ : R → [0, 1] l and define the probability κ(A) := λ l (ψ(A)), A ∈ B(R), where λ l is the l-dimensional Lebesgue-measure restricted to [0, 1] is such that (f 1 (E), . . . , f l (E)) has law λ l and the f i are measurable and we get the required result, remarking that λ l is the uniform law on [0, 1] l .
Lemma 9.5. Let µ(dy, dz) = ν(y, dz)δ(dy) be a probability on R N2 × R N1 such that δ(dy) is a probability on R N2 and ν(y, dz) is a probabilistic kernel. Assume that Y has law δ(dy) and E is independent of Y and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then there is a measurable function G : R N2 × [0, 1] → R N1 such that (Y, G(Y, E)) has law µ(dy, dz).
Proof. Just like in the previous proof, fix a Borel isomorphism ψ : R → R N1 . Consider the measure on R×R N2 defined byμ(A×B) := A ν(y, ψ(B))δ(dy), A ∈ B(R N2 ), B ∈ B(R). For δ-almost every y, ν(y, ψ(·)) is a probability measure on R. Let F (y, z) := ν(y, ψ((−∞, z]))) denote its cumulative distribution function and define F − (y, u) := inf{q ∈ Q : F (y, q) ≥ u}, u ∈ (0, 1), this is easily seen to be B(R N2 ) ⊗ B([0, 1])-measurable. Then, for δ-almost every y, F − (y, E) has law ν(y, ψ(·)). Hence (Y, F − (Y, E)) has lawμ. Consequently, (Y, ψ(F − (Y, E))) has law µ and we may conclude setting G(y, u) := ψ(F − (y, u)). The technique of this proof is well-known, see e.g. page 228 of Bhattacharya and Waymire (1990) .
The following Lemmata are used in section 8. Lemma 9.6 is standard and its proof is omitted.
Lemma 9.6. Let X be a real-valued random variable with atomless law. Let F (x) := P (X ≤ x) denote its cumulative distribution function. Then F (X) has uniform law on [0, 1].
Lemma 9.7. Let (X, W ) be an (n + m)-dimensional random variable such that the conditional law of X w.r.t. σ(W ) is a.s. atomless. Then there is a measurable G : R n+m → R n such that G(X, W ) is independent of W with uniform law on [0, 1].
Proof. Let us fix a Borel-isomorphism ψ : R n → R. Note that ψ(X) also has an a.s. atomless conditional law w.r.t. σ(W ). Define (using a regular version of the conditional law), H(x, w) := P (ψ(X) ≤ x|W = w), (x, w) ∈ R × R m , this is B(R) ⊗ B(R m )-measurable (using p. 70 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) and the fact that H is continuous in x a.s. by hypothesis and measurable for each fixed w since we took a regular version of the conditional law). It follows by Lemma 9.6 that the conditional law of H(ψ(X), W ) w.r.t. σ(W ) is a.s. uniform on [0, 1] which means that it is independent of W . Hence we may define G(x, w) := H(ψ(x), w), which is measurable since H and ψ are measurable.
Thus Lemma 9.8 provides a homeomorphism s : R k+1 → R k+1 such that s m (x 1 , . . . , x k+1 ) = x m , 1 ≤ m ≤ k and W k+1 := s k+1 (W 1 , . . . ,W k+1 ) is independent of (W 1 , . . . ,W k ) (and hence of (W 1 , . . . , W k ) = g k (k) −1 (W 1 , . . . ,W k )). Define a : R k+1 → R k+1 by a(x 1 , . . . , x k+1 ) := (g k (k) −1 (x 1 , . . . , x k ), s k+1 (x 1 , . . . , x k+1 )) = s(g k (k) −1 (x 1 , . . . , x k ), x k+1 ), a is a homeomorphism since it is the composition of two homeomorphisms. Notice that a(W 1 , . . . ,W k+1 ) = (W 1 , . . . , W k+1 ). Set g k+1 (k + 1) := a −1 . This finishes the proof of the induction step and hence concludes the proof.
